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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In this appeal, Clifton Sykes, Sr. challenges the judgment 
of the District Court affirming the Social Security 
Administration's final decision denying him disability 
benefits. The case compels us to revisit the use of the 
medical-vocational guidelines in the regulations 
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promulgated under the Social Security Act to establish that 
there are jobs in the national economy that a claimant can 
perform when the claimant has both exertional and 
nonexertional impairments. 
 
After suffering several job-related injuries, Sykesfiled for 
Disability Insurance Benefits with the Social Security 
Administration. The Commissioner of Social Security 
("Commissioner") found Sykes to be not disabled within the 
meaning of the Social Security Act. Sykes then requested a 
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The 
ALJ concluded that Sykes had several severe impairments, 
at least one of which (left-eye blindness) is a nonexertional 
impairment under the regulations. The ALJ nevertheless 
denied Sykes's application. Applying the medical-vocational 
guidelines "as a framework" (and without referring to a 
vocational expert or other evidence), the ALJ concluded that 
Sykes's exertional impairments left him able to perform 
light work, and that the exclusion of jobs requiring 
binocular vision from light work positions in consideration 
of his nonexertional impairment did not significantly 
compromise Sykes's broad occupational base under the 
guidelines. The denial became a final decision when the 
Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied 
Sykes's request for a review of the ALJ's decision. 
 
We conclude that, under Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 
458 (1983) (construing the Social Security Act and 
upholding regulations promulgated thereunder), and in the 
absence of a rulemaking establishing the fact of an 
undiminished occupational base, the Commissioner cannot 
determine that a claimant's nonexertional impairments do 
not significantly erode his occupational base under the 
medical-vocational guidelines without either taking 
additional vocational evidence establishing as much or 
providing notice to the claimant of his intention to take 
official notice of this fact (and providing the claimant with 
an opportunity to counter the conclusion). Accordingly, we 
will reverse the order of the District Court and remand the 
case with instructions to return the case to the 
Commissioner for further proceedings. We reject Sykes's 
claim that the Social Security Administration has failed to 
acquiesce in this Court's prior decisions. 
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I. 
 
Prior to filing for disability, Sykes worked for twenty-one 
years as a tractor-trailer operator. This work was physically 
strenuous, requiring on most days that Sykes load and 
unload seventy-five to eighty pound loads. During the 
course of his employment, Sykes suffered several injuries. 
In 1986, he tore the rotator cuff in his right shoulder while 
lifting steel off the side of the highway and putting it on his 
truck. This injury required surgery, and during his recovery 
Sykes was unable to work for nine months. Two years later, 
he injured his right arm and hand and had to take off two 
weeks to recover. In 1993, he re-injured his rotator cuff 
while binding steel to his truck. He underwent several 
months of physical therapy for this injury. Sykes also 
suffers from an obstructive pulmonary disorder and 
unstable angina, which cause him chest pain and which 
required hospitalization in 1993. The final blow to Sykes's 
employment as a tractor-trailer operator came when a 
bungee cord snapped as he was securing metal to his truck 
and ruptured the globe of his left eye. This injury left him 
permanently blinded in that eye. 
 
Sykes never returned to work after the eye injury, and he 
filed for Disability Insurance Benefits with the Social 
Security Administration. In December 1994, the 
Commissioner found Sykes to be not disabled within the 
meaning of the Social Security Act, both in the initial 
determination and on reconsideration. Sykes then 
requested a hearing before an ALJ. Sykes complained of a 
variety of disabilities he characterized as severe: left-eye 
blindness, the inability to lift his right arm above the 
shoulder, angina, obstructive pulmonary disease, pain, and 
depression. The ALJ concluded that Sykes's depression was 
not severe, refused to credit his subjective complaints of 
pain, and determined that he could reach above his right 
shoulder. Applying the regulation governing the 
determination of disability, the ALJ found that Sykes had 
several severe impairments -- left eye blindness, the 
residual effects of a torn rotator cuff, angina, and 
obstructive pulmonary disease -- and that he could not 
perform his past work. He also concluded that Sykes was 
not disabled because there was other work in the national 
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economy that Sykes could perform. The Social Security 
Administration Appeals Council denied Sykes's request for 
a review of the ALJ's decision. 
 
Sykes then filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey seeking review of the 
ALJ's decision. He argued that the ALJ erred in relying 
exclusively on the grids in assessing whether there were 
jobs in the national economy that Sykes could perform 
when his impairments were both exertional and 
nonexertional. Sykes also challenged the ALJ's conclusions 
that he could lift his right arm above his shoulder and that 
his depression was not severe. The District Court affirmed 
the ALJ's decision upholding the Commissioner's denial of 
benefits, concluding that these assessments were supported 
by substantial evidence. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the final decision 
denying Sykes's benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S 405(g). We 
have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final decision of 
the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review 
the factual findings of the Commissioner only to determine 
whether the administrative record contains substantial 
evidence supporting the findings. See 42 U.S.C. S 405(g); 
Simmonds v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1986) (even 
if the record could sustain an alternative conclusion, the 
ALJ's decision regarding disability will not be overturned as 
long as there is substantial evidence to support it). Our 
review of legal issues is plenary. See Schaudeck v. 
Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  
 
II. 
 
In addition to other requirements not at issue here, a 
claimant is entitled to total disability benefits under the 
Social Security Act "only if his physical or mental 
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is 
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work experience, 
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 
exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. S 423(d)(2)(A). 
The Act contemplates that disability determinations will be 
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individualized and be based on evidence adduced at a 
hearing. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) 
(noting that the Act requires individualized determination 
based on evidence adduced at a hearing); see also 42 
U.S.C. S 405(b) (requiring consideration of each individual's 
condition and stating that an individual may request that a 
disability determination be based on evidence adduced at a 
hearing). The Act also gives the Social Security 
Administration authority to develop regulations 
implementing these provisions. See Campbell, 461 U.S. at 
466. 
 
The Social Security Administration has promulgated a 
five-step process for evaluating disability claims. See 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1520 (1999). First, the Commissioner 
considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in 
substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the 
Commissioner considers in the second step whether the 
claimant has a "severe impairment" that significantly limits 
his physical or mental ability to perform basic work 
activities. If the claimant suffers a severe impairment, the 
third inquiry is whether, based on the medical evidence, the 
impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in 
the "listing of impairments," 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 
app. 1 (1999), which result in a presumption of disability, 
or whether the claimant retains the capacity to work. If the 
impairment does not meet the criteria for a listed 
impairment, then the Commissioner assesses in the fourth 
step whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant 
has the residual functional capacity to perform his past 
work. If the claimant cannot perform his past work, then 
the final step is to determine whether there is other work in 
the national economy that the claimant can perform. 1 The 
claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and 
four of this test. The Commissioner bears the burden of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The regulations direct the Commissioner to consider the four factors 
Congress has identified as relevant to the disability determination: 
physical ability, age, education, and work experience. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(f) (1999). 
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proof for the last step. See Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 
146 n.5 (1987).2 
 
Under the regulations, impairments can be either 
exertional or nonexertional. Impairments are classified as 
exertional if they affect the claimant's 
 
       ability to meet the strength demands of jobs. The 
       classification of a limitation as exertional is related to 
       the United States Department of Labor's classification 
       of jobs by various exertional levels (sedentary, light, 
       medium, heavy, and very heavy) in terms of the 
       strength demands for sitting, standing, walking, lifting, 
       carrying, pushing, and pulling. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1569a (1999). All other impairments are 
classified as nonexertional. See id. 
 
Prior to 1978, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services relied on vocational experts to establish the 
existence of suitable jobs in the national economy for all 
claimants (the fifth step of the inquiry). After a claimant's 
limitations and abilities had been determined at a hearing, 
a vocational expert ordinarily would testify as to whether 
work existed that the claimant could perform. See Heckler 
v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983). In 1978, to improve 
both the uniformity and efficiency of this determination, the 
Secretary promulgated, through an administrative 
rulemaking, medical-vocational guidelines, or "grids," that 
establish the types and number of jobs that exist in the 
national economy for claimants with exertional 
impairments. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 
(1999). The grids consist of a matrix of four 
factors--physical ability, age, education, and work 
experience--and set forth rules that identify whether jobs 
requiring specific combinations of these factors exist in 
significant numbers in the national economy.3 Where a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because step three involves a conclusive presumption based on the 
listings, no one bears that burden of proof. See Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146- 
47 n.5. 
 
3. Each of these four factors is divided into defined categories. A 
person's 
ability to perform physical tasks, for example, is categorized according 
to 
the physical exertion requirements necessary to perform varying classes 
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claimant's qualifications correspond to the job requirements 
identified by a rule, the guidelines direct a conclusion that 
work exists that the claimant can perform.4 
 
In Campbell, 461 U.S. at 467, the Supreme Court held 
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (now the 
Commissioner of Social Security) may rely on these grids to 
establish that jobs exist in the national economy that a 
person with the claimant's exertional limitations could 
perform.5 The claimant argued that the grids violated the 
Social Security Act because they failed to provide for the 
required individualized determination on the issue whether 
there were jobs in the national economy that the claimant 
could perform. The Supreme Court upheld reliance on the 
grids because, although the Social Security Act 
contemplates that disability hearings will be individualized 
determinations based on evidence adduced at a hearing, 
the statute "does not bar the Secretary from relying on 
rulemaking to resolve certain classes of issues." Id. The 
Court explained that "even where an agency's enabling 
statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency 
may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues 
that do not require case-by-case consideration." Id. (citing 
FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States 
v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956)). 
 
The regulations require the Commissioner to make 
findings regarding the individual claimant's abilities and 
impairments on the basis of evidence adduced at a hearing 
and to afford claimants ample opportunity both to present 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of jobs--i.e., whether a claimant can perform sedentary, light, medium, 
heavy, or very heavy work. See 20 C.F.R.S 404.1567 (1999). Each of 
these work categories is defined in terms of the physical demands it 
places on a worker, such as the weight of objects he must lift, and 
whether extensive movement, or use of arm and leg controls, is required. 
See id. 
 
4. The claimant has an opportunity to rebut this conclusion. See Heckler 
v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983). 
 
5. The Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 
1994, Pub.L. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, substituted the "Commissioner of 
Social Security" for the "Secretary" in a variety of subsections. See also 
42 U.S.C.A. 403, at 80 (West Supp. 2000) (noting substitution). 
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evidence relating to their own abilities and to offer evidence 
that the guidelines do not apply to them. See id. at 467. 
The grids only apply to "an issue that is not unique to each 
claimant--the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the 
national economy. This type of general factual issue may be 
resolved as fairly through rulemaking as by introducing the 
testimony of vocational experts at each disability hearing." 
Id. at 468 (citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics 
Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc)); see also 
Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United 
Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 228 (1991) (agency may 
establish general facts by a rulemaking even when the 
enabling statute requires the agency to hold a hearing). 
 
The Court also considered in Campbell whether the use 
of the grids to establish the presence of jobs in the national 
economy violated legal standards for the administrative or 
official notice of facts, which require "that when an agency 
takes official or administrative notice of facts, a litigant 
must be given an adequate opportunity to respond." 
Campbell, 461 U.S. at 469; see also 5 U.S.C. S 556(e) 
(governing administrative notice). The Court rejected this 
argument, holding that 
 
       [t]his principle is inapplicable [ ] when the agency has 
       promulgated valid regulations. Its purpose is to provide 
       a procedural safeguard: to ensure the accuracy of the 
       facts of which an agency takes notice. But when the 
       accuracy of those facts already has been tested fairly 
       during rulemaking, the rulemaking proceeding itself 
       provides sufficient procedural protection. 
 
Campbell, 461 U.S. at 470 (emphasis added). This suggests 
that, in the absence of some procedural safeguard (such as 
a rulemaking), the Court would require that the 
Commissioner comply with the requirements for 
administrative notice even for issues "that [are] not unique 
to each claimant," id. at 468, such as the types and 
numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy for a 
claimant with exertional and nonexertional impairments. 
The Court was satisfied that the regulation setting forth the 
grids could substitute for an individualized determination 
because it was subject to procedural safeguards (in the 
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rulemaking) sufficient to ensure that the purposes of notice 
were served. 
 
Sykes's appeal requires us to decide whether, under 
Campbell, and in the absence of a rulemaking establishing 
the fact of an undiminished occupational base, the 
Commissioner can determine that a claimant's 
nonexertional impairments do not significantly erode his 
occupational base under the grids without either taking 
additional vocational evidence establishing as much or 
providing notice to the claimant of his intention to take 
official notice of this fact (and providing the claimant with 
an opportunity to counter the conclusion). If the 
Commissioner cannot make such a determination 
consistent with Campbell and the Social Security Act, then 
the District Court order affirming the ALJ's decision must 
be reversed. 
 
III. 
 
Applying the five-step analysis described above, the ALJ 
concluded that (1) Sykes was not currently employed in 
substantial gainful activity; (2) that he had the following 
severe impairments (exertional and nonexertional): left-eye 
blindness, the residual effects of a torn rotator cuff, angina, 
and obstructive pulmonary disease; (3) that these 
impairments did not meet the criteria for listed 
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 
(1999), and that Sykes retained the capacity to perform 
light work; (4) that Sykes lacked the residual functional 
capacity to perform his past work; and (5) that there were 
other jobs in the national economy that Sykes could 
perform. 
 
In the fifth step of the test (for which the government 
bears the burden of proof), the ALJ did not consider any 
evidence in addition to the grids in making his 
determination that there were jobs in the national economy 
that Sykes could perform. Instead, applying the grids "as a 
framework" (and without referring to a vocational expert or 
other evidence), the ALJ concluded that there were jobs in 
the national economy that Sykes could perform because the 
exclusion of jobs requiring binocular vision from light work 
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positions did not, in his view, significantly compromise 
Sykes's broad occupational base for light work. The ALJ's 
decision states that "using medical-vocational`grid' rule 
202.11, Table 1, Subpart P, Appendix 2, as a framework for 
decision-making, I find that jobs exist in significant 
numbers in the national economy that he has had the 
capacity to perform. The exclusion of jobs requiring 
binocular vision does not significantly compromise the 
broad base of light work."6 
 
On appeal, Sykes challenges the ALJ's assessment of his 
depression; the ALJ's rejection of his subjective complaints 
of pain in his shoulder, chest, and arms; the conclusion 
that he could raise his right arm above his shoulder; and 
the conclusion that his impairments do not meet the 
criteria for listed impairments. We agree with the District 
Court that the ALJ's conclusions regarding Sykes's 
depression and about the listings were supported by 
substantial evidence.7 We do not believe, however, that the 
finding that Sykes can raise his right arm above his 
shoulder was supported by substantial evidence. Sykes 
testified that he could not, and no evidence contradicts this 
testimony.8 Additionally, the Commissioner failed to explain 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Dr. Goldfeder, who made several reports on Sykes's condition that are 
a part of the record, opined that Sykes could be employed as a one-eyed 
individual. We reject the Commissioner's contention that this opinion 
supported the ALJ's conclusion. Dr. Goldfeder is not a vocational exert, 
and his medical opinion cannot be considered vocational evidence that 
work is available to one-eyed individuals in the national economy. 
7. Sykes has never been hospitalized for a mental condition, has never 
been prescribed psychotropic medication, and has never undergone 
therapy. Dr. Candela, a consultative psychiatrist for the Social Security 
Administration, assessed the severity of Sykes's mental condition as 
mild. Dr. Pollock, who examined Sykes four times over the course of 
several years, reported that Sykes's speech was coherent and logical and 
that there was no evidence of formal thought disturbance. He also 
opined that Sykes suffers from a disabling psychiatric impairment. But 
Pollock was not Sykes's treating physician. His opinion thus was not 
entitled to controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1527(d) (only a 
treating source's opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of an 
individual's impairment, if supported by medical evidence, is to be given 
controlling weight). 
8. Indeed, in his brief in the District Court, the Commissioner appears to 
concede that this conclusion was in error, noting that the ALJ 
"inadvertently indicated that plaintiff could raise his right arm above 
his 
shoulder." 
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adequately his reasons for rejecting or discrediting evidence 
of Sykes's subjective complaints of pain.9  We will direct him 
to reconsider on remand the findings regarding these 
complaints. 
 
The remaining (and key) question raised by Sykes's 
appeal is whether the Commissioner met his burden of 
proof for the step-five inquiry of establishing that there are 
jobs in the national economy that Sykes can perform given 
the impairments that the ALJ did accept. In Burnam v. 
Schweiker, 682 F.2d 456, 458 (3d Cir. 1982), we held that 
the Commissioner cannot meet this burden by relying 
exclusively on the grids when the claimant has both 
exertional and nonexertional impairments.10 At issue in this 
case is the scope of this limitation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The ALJ concluded that although Sykes had"underlying medically 
determinable impairments that could produce some of the pain and 
other symptoms alleged, the evidence does not reasonably support the 
intensity and the frequency asserted." The only explanation offered for 
this conclusion was that Sykes has only received"conservative 
treatment" for pain. This explanation is insufficient. The Commissioner's 
interpretation of the regulations regarding pain states that "[o]nce 
adjudicators determine that the individual has an impairment which is 
reasonably expected to produce some pain, they must consider all of the 
evidence relevant to the individual's allegations of pain, even if the 
alleged pain is more severe or persistent than would be expected." 
Evaluation of Symptoms, Including Pain, 56 Fed. Reg. 57,932 (1991) 
(interpreting regulations regarding the evaluation of symptoms including 
pain, 20 C.F.R. S 404.1529). Similarly, we have stated that "[w]here 
competent evidence supports a claimant's claims, the ALJ must explicitly 
weigh the evidence, see Dobrowolsky [v. Califano], 606 F.2d [403,] 407 
[(3d Cir. 1979)], and explain a rejection of the evidence." Schaudeck v. 
Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 435 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing Benton v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1987)). "Where the 
Secretary is faced with conflicting evidence, he must adequately explain 
in the record his reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent 
evidence." Benton, 820 F.2d at 88. The Commissioner failed to meet this 
standard in evaluating Sykes's complaints of pain. 
10. Hereinafter, we will discuss only those impairments that the ALJ 
determined to be severe, treating (as did the ALJ) the left-eye blindness 
as a nonexertional impairment and the other impairments as exertional 
impairments. We note, however, that on remand the ALJ should consider 
whether some aspects of the impairments that are identified are 
nonexertional. Sykes asserts that the residual effects of the torn rotator 
cuff and his pulmonary and cardiac conditions have nonexertional 
manifestations as well as exertional ones. 
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The government argues that the ALJ appropriately used 
the grids in this case "as a framework." According to the 
government, the ALJ properly looked to the jobs listed 
under light work and made an independent determination 
that Sykes's lack of binocular vision did not significantly 
diminish his residual functional capacity. The government 
argues that, under the Social Security Act and the 
regulations interpreting it, the ALJ can make the 
determination regarding disability and need not take 
additional vocational evidence if he determines that the 
nonexertional impairment does not significantly erode the 
occupational base of the category of work that the claimant 
can perform given his exertional impairments. 
 
A. The Grids and Nonexertional Impairments 
 
The Social Security Administration has promulgated 
regulations governing the determination of disability when 
the claimant has an impairment or combination of 
impairments resulting in both exertional limitations and 
nonexertional limitations. The regulation governing the 
assessment of nonexertional limitations provides that, if a 
finding of disability is not possible based on exertional 
limitations alone, 
 
       the rule(s) reflecting the individual's maximum residual 
       strength capabilities, age, education, and work 
       experience provide a framework for consideration of 
       how much the individual's work capability is further 
       diminished in terms of any types of jobs that would be 
       contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations. Also, 
       in these combinations of nonexertional and exertional 
       limitations which cannot be wholly determined under 
       the rules in this appendix 2, full consideration must be 
       given to all of the relevant facts in the case in 
       accordance with the definitions and discussions of 
       each factor in the appropriate sections of the 
       regulations, which will provide insight into the 
       adjudicative weight to be accorded each factor. 
 
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, S 200.00(e)(2) (1999). 
The government argues that, under this regulation, the ALJ 
need not refer to any additional evidence in determining 
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whether a nonexertional impairment erodes residual 
functional capacity. 
 
The courts of appeals agree at a general level that the 
grids cannot automatically establish that there are jobs in 
the national economy when a claimant has severe 
exertional and nonexertional impairments.11 In Burnam v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 890 F.2d 
520, 524 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (where a claimant has 
nonexertional impairments in addition to exertional limits, the grid may 
not accurately reflect the availability of jobs such a claimant could 
perform); Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[I]f a 
claimant suffers from additional `nonexertional' impairments, the grid 
rules may not be controlling."); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 518 
(4th Cir. 1987) (an ALJ may not rely solely on the grids where 
"nonexertional limitations . . . occur in conjunction with exertional 
limitations"); Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987) (when 
the claimant has nonexertional impairments that significantly affect his 
residual functional capacity, the ALJ may not rely exclusively on the 
guidelines in determining whether there is other work available that the 
claimant can perform); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 926-27 (6th Cir. 
1990) (when the claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment 
significantly restricting the range of available work, the grids may be 
used only as a framework to provide guidance for decision making, and 
not to direct a conclusion of nondisability); Warmoth v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 
1109, 1112 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (when a claimant's nonexertional 
impairments further restrict his range of employment opportunities, 
application of the grids is precluded); Fenton v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 907, 910 
(8th Cir. 1998) (the Commissioner must produce vocational expert 
testimony concerning the availability of jobs that a person with a 
claimant's particular characteristics can perform, if his or her 
characteristics do not match those in the regulations); Cooper v. 
Sullivan, 
880 F.2d 1152, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1989) (if the exertional impairments 
alone are insufficient to direct a finding of disability, analysis in 
addition 
to the grids is required); Channel v. Heckler , 747 F.2d 577, 582 (10th 
Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (without a "specificfinding, supported by 
substantial evidence, that despite his non-exertional impairments, [the 
claimant] could perform a full range of sedentary work on a sustained 
basis, it was improper for the ALJ conclusively to apply the grids in 
determining that [the claimant] was not disabled"); Swindle v. Sullivan, 
914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("If [the claimant's] non- 
exertional impairments significantly limit basic work activities, the ALJ 
should not rely solely on the Grids and should take evidence from a 
vocational expert to determine whether there exists in the national 
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Schweiker, 682 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1982), we rejected 
reliance on the grids in this situation because the medical- 
vocational grids do not "purport to establish the existence 
of jobs for persons . . . with both exertional and 
nonexertional impairments." Id. at 458; see also 
Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 967-68 (3d Cir. 1985) 
("[G]iven the Secretary's failure to present any evidence of 
[the claimant's] ability to work independent of the 
prescriptions of the grids, a finding that appellant was not 
disabled is simply contrary to this Court's precedent."); 
Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 
1150, 1155 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("Such an 
inappropriate reliance on the grid regulations to determine 
the disability of an individual with both exertional and non- 
exertional impairments would be contrary to Burnam."). 
 
There is, however, considerable variety among the courts 
of appeals regarding the scope of the limitation on the use 
of the grids when a claimant has exertional and 
nonexertional impairments. Some cases from the other 
circuits have held that the bar on exclusive reliance on the 
grids in this situation is limited by the requirement that the 
nonexertional impairment invoked must be significant 
enough to limit further the range of work permitted by the 
exertional limitations (the residual functional capacity) 
before it precludes application of the grids. See, e.g., 
Heggarty v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 990, 996 (1st Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam) (noting law of circuit that the Commissioner may 
rely on the grids if the claimant's nonexertional impairment 
does not "significantly" affect his or her ability to perform 
the full range of jobs at the appropriate exertional level); 
Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding 
that if the guidelines adequately reflect a claimant's 
condition, using them to determine disability status is 
appropriate, "[b]ut if a claimant's nonexertional 
impairments significantly limit the range of work permitted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
economy a significant number of jobs for someone with [the claimant's] 
limitations"); Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(recognizing that "applying the grids to a claimant with nonexertional 
impairments may lead to an inaccurate finding that jobs exist that the 
claimant can perform"). 
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by his exertional limitations then the grids obviously will 
not accurately determine disability status because they fail 
to take into account claimant's nonexertional impairments" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Fraga v. Bowen, 810 
F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987) (when the claimant's 
nonexertional impairments do not significantly affect his 
residual functional capacity, the ALJ may rely exclusively 
on the guidelines in determining whether there is other 
work available that the claimant can perform); Warmoth v. 
Bowen, 798 F.2d 1109, 1112 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) 
("While a vocational expert's specialized knowledge 
undoubtedly would be helpful in the present case, this is 
not to say that testimony from such an expert is required 
in this and every other case involving a non-exertional 
impairment; rather, we only require that there be reliable 
evidence of some kind that would persuade a reasonable 
person that the limitations in question do not significantly 
diminish the employment opportunities otherwise 
available." (citation omitted)); Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 
577, 582 n.6 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that 
"the mere presence of a nonexertional impairment does not 
automatically preclude reliance on the grids"; rather, 
reliance on the grids is foreclosed only when the 
nonexertional impairment poses an additional limitation on 
the claimant's ability to perform a range of available jobs.).12 
 
This described limitation on the rule against exclusive 
reliance on the grids when the claimant has exertional and 
nonexertional impairments significantly narrows the rule. It 
leaves the ALJ free to assess whether there is credible 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. A finding under step two of the regulations that a claimant has a 
"severe" nonexertional limitation is not the same as a finding that the 
nonexertional limitation affects residual functional capacity. The cases 
cited above do not rely on the "severity" determination, but rather 
impose an additional requirement that the nonexertional impairment 
limit the capacity for work beyond the claimant's residual functional 
capacity, given the limitations imposed by the exertional impairment. 
See, e.g., Bapp, 802 F.2d at 606 ("By the use of the phrase `significantly 
diminish' we mean the additional loss of work capacity beyond a 
negligible one or, in other words, one that so narrows a claimant's 
possible range of work as to deprive him of a meaningful employment 
opportunity."). 
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evidence that the nonexertional impairment limits residual 
functional capacity before going off the grids, in effect 
allowing the ALJ to refer to the grids (and consider the 
medical evidence) to determine whether the nonexertional 
impairment is severe enough to make the grids inapplicable 
before considering any evidence in addition to the grids. 
See, e.g., Bapp, 802 F.2d at 606 ("Upon remand the ALJ 
must reevaluate whether the Secretary has shown that 
plaintiff's capability to perform the full range of light work 
was not significantly diminished [by his nonexertional 
impairments]. That initial determination can be made 
without resort to a vocational expert."). 
 
The government's interpretation of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 
Subpart P, Appendix 2, S 200.00(e)(2) (1999) in effect 
adopts this limitation on the rule barring exclusive reliance 
on the grids when the claimant has exertional and 
nonexertional impairments. In Washington v. Heckler, 756 
F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1985), we left open the possibility that the 
Commissioner could use the grids as a "framework" for 
determining the extent to which a nonexertional limitation 
may further diminish work capacity. See id. at 967-68. But 
the framework approach does not comport with Heckler v. 
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983), when it is defined as 
broadly as it is here. 
 
The regulation provides that, where an individual has an 
impairment or a combination of impairments resulting in 
both exertional and nonexertional limitations, if afinding of 
disability is not possible based on exertional limitations 
alone, the grids "provide a framework for consideration of 
how much the individual's work capability is further 
diminished in terms of any types of jobs that would be 
contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations." 20 C.F.R. 
pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, S 200.00(e)(2) (1999). By 
comparison, the regulations governing a determination of 
disability when the claimant has solely exertional 
impairments direct a finding of disability without reference 
to additional evidence when the factors of the claimant's 
particular impairments coincide with the criteria of a rule: 
 
       The existence of jobs in the national economy is 
       reflected in the "Decisions" shown in the rules; i.e., in 
       promulgating the rules, administrative notice has been 
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       taken of the numbers of unskilled jobs that exist 
       throughout the national economy at the various 
       functional levels (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and 
       very heavy) as supported by the "Dictionary of 
       Occupational Titles" and the "Occupational Outlook 
       Handbook," published by the Department of Labor; the 
       "County Business Patterns" and "Census Surveys" 
       published by the Bureau of the Census; and 
       occupational surveys of light and sedentary jobs 
       prepared for the Social Security Administration by 
       various State employment agencies. Thus, when all 
       factors coincide with the criteria of a rule, the existence 
       of such jobs is established. However, the existence of 
       such jobs for individuals whose remaining functional 
       capacity or other factors do not coincide with the 
       criteria of a rule must be further considered in terms 
       of what kinds of jobs or types of work may be either 
       additionally indicated or precluded. 
 
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2,S 200.00(b) (1999). 
 
As this comparison between the regulations makes clear, 
the only facts established in the grids are of unskilled jobs 
in the national economy for claimants with exertional 
impairments who fit the criteria of the rule at the various 
functional levels. The regulations do not purport to 
establish jobs that exist in the national economy at the 
various functional levels when a claimant has a 
nonexertional impairment (or does not meet the criteria of 
the rule for other reasons). 
 
The Supreme Court upheld reliance on the grids to 
determine whether there are jobs in the national economy 
for claimants who have only exertional impairments 
because, even though the Social Security Act requires an 
individualized determination regarding disability, the 
agency had promulgated valid regulations identifying these 
jobs and the availability of jobs was an issue that did not 
require case-by-case determination. See Campbell , 461 U.S. 
at 467 (1983) ("[E]ven where an agency's enabling statute 
expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely 
on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not 
require case-by-case determination."). The regulations still 
require an individualized hearing in which the claimant has 
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an opportunity to present evidence regarding his particular 
disabilities; the grids only apply to "an issue that is not 
unique to each claimant--the types and numbers of jobs 
that exist in the national economy. This type of general 
factual issue may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking 
as by introducing the testimony of vocational experts at 
each disability hearing." Id. at 468 (citations omitted). 
 
Like the availability of jobs for claimants with exertional 
impairments, the availability of jobs for claimants with 
exertional and nonexertional impairments may well be an 
issue that does not require case-by-case determination and 
may be fairly resolved through rulemaking. But the Social 
Security Administration has not promulgated regulations 
identifying jobs in the national economy for claimants with 
combined exertional and nonexertional limitations or 
identifying nonexertional impairments that are not 
significant enough to diminish a claimant's occupation base 
considering his exertional impairment alone. Campbell, by 
force of implication, requires such a regulation (or similar 
procedure establishing general facts) in order to direct a 
determination of disability without reference to 
individualized evidence that there are jobs in the national 
economy that the claimant can perform. Until the 
government takes steps to establish such general facts for 
claimants with exertional and nonexertional impairments, 
the government cannot satisfy its burden under the Act by 
reference to the grids alone. 
 
At least one of our sister circuits has recognized that the 
determination whether the nonexertional impairment 
significantly erodes residual functional capacity cannot be 
made without reference to additional evidence. In Francis v. 
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1985), a case also 
involving the loss of vision, the ALJ, after acknowledging 
that the claimant was limited to performing medium work 
requiring only gross vision, nevertheless applied the grids 
because he was "persuaded" that this impairment did not 
significantly limit the range of medium work available to 
claimant. The Eleventh Circuit reversed because"there 
[was] no vocational testimony upon which the ALJ could 
have relied to be so persuaded." Id. at 1567. 
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The Social Security Administration has not conducted a 
rulemaking establishing either that the lack of binocular 
vision does not significantly diminish the occupational base 
for light work or more generally establishing common facts 
applicable to individuals with Sykes's set of impairments. 
The grids establish, for exertional impairments only, that 
jobs exist in the national economy that people with those 
impairments can perform. When a claimant has an 
additional nonexertional impairment, the question whether 
that impairment diminishes his residual functional capacity 
is functionally the same as the question whether there are 
jobs in the national economy that he can perform given his 
combination of impairments. The grids do not purport to 
answer this question, and thus under Campbell  the 
practice of the ALJ determining without taking additional 
evidence the effect of the nonexertional impairment on 
residual functional capacity cannot stand.13 
 
We note that in the District Court and on appeal, the 
government asserted that two Social Security rulings 
establish that the loss of binocular vision does not 
significantly erode the occupational base of jobs in the light 
work category. According to the government, Social Security 
Rulings 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, and 83-14, 1983 WL 
56857, "consider the impact of visual impairments on an 
individual's occupational base." Social Security Rulings are 
agency rulings published "under the authority of the 
Commissioner of Social Security" and "are binding on all 
components of the Social Security Administration." 20 
C.F.R. S 402.35(b)(1) (1999); see also Heckler v. Edwards, 
465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3 (1984) (citing Social Security Ruling 
stating that "[o]nce published, a ruling is binding on all 
components of the Social Security Administration . .. . 
Rulings do not have the force and effect of the law or 
regulations but are to be relied upon as precedents in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987) , is not to the contrary. It 
merely upholds the requirement under step two of thefive-part test in 
the regulation that the claimant show that he has a severe impairment, 
i.e., an impairment that significantly limits the ability to do basic work 
activities. See id. at 145. At step five, the claimant has already shown 
that he has limitations that have been determined to be severe in this 
sense. 
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determining other cases where the facts are basically the 
same. A ruling may be superseded, modified, or revoked by 
later legislation, regulations, court decisions or rulings."). 
 
We do not decide here whether Social Security Rulings 
can serve the same function as the rulemaking upheld in 
Campbell, for the ALJ did not attempt to rely on these 
rulings to support the conclusion that the lack of binocular 
vision does not significantly erode the occupational base for 
light work. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 
318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (judicial review of an administrative 
agency requires "a judgment upon the validity of the 
grounds upon which the [agency] itself based its action").14 
Moreover, the cited rulings cannot be said to direct a 
determination of nondisability in Sykes's case. They simply 
provide factors for consideration regarding the 
determination of disability.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Campbell held that reliance on the grids to establish the presence of 
jobs in the national economy for claimants who have exertional 
impairments comported with the requirements of official notice only 
because "when the accuracy of those facts already has been tested fairly 
during rulemaking, the rulemaking proceeding itself provides sufficient 
procedural protection." 461 U.S. at 470. Sykes argues that informal 
agency publications like Social Security Rulings cannot play a role 
similar to rulemaking in establishing the presence of jobs in the national 
economy for persons with exertional and nonexertional impairments 
because, unlike the rulemaking, they are "not based on volumes of 
vocational data." The government counters that the Commissioner can 
properly refer to a ruling for guidance as to when nonexertional 
limitations may significantly compromise the range of work that an 
individual can perform. We need not resolve the issue here. While not 
entirely apposite, in that we deal here with a prior agency determination 
of fact, we note that in the recent case of Christensen v. Harris County, 
120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000), the Supreme Court held that when an agency 
issues statements of policy through opinion letters, enforcement 
guidelines, or similar materials that have not been formulated either 
through formal adjudication or through notice-and-comment rulemaking 
(and do not represent an agency's interpretation of its own otherwise- 
ambiguous regulations), such statements do not have the force of law, 
though they may have the "power to persuade," id. at 1663 (quoting 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 
15. See SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *8 ("As a general rule, even if a 
person's visual impairment(s) were to eliminate all jobs that involve very 
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B. Administrative Notice 
 
Sykes argues that the Commissioner cannot rely on 
administrative notice to establish that lack of binocular 
vision does not erode the occupational base for light work 
as defined under the grids. We agree that the government 
cannot support the ALJ's action in this case on a theory of 
administrative notice, though our holding does not preclude 
the use of administrative notice on remand or in another 
case. 
 
Official notice is the proper method for agency 
decisionmakers to apply knowledge not included in the 
record. It is the administrative law counterpart of judicial 
notice. Both doctrines allow adjudicators to take notice of 
commonly acknowledged facts, but official notice is broader 
than judicial notice insofar as it also allows an 
administrative agency to take notice of technical or 
scientific facts that are within the agency's area of 
expertise. See McLeod v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing NLRB v. Seven-Up 
Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953)). Section 556(e) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") sets forth the 
requirements for official notice in the administrative law 
context. It provides that "[w]hen an agency decision rests 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
good vision (such as working with small objects or reading small print), 
as long as he or she retains sufficient visual acuity to be able to handle 
and work with rather large objects (and has the visual fields to avoid 
ordinary hazards in a workplace), there would be a substantial number 
of jobs remaining across all exertional levels. However, a finding of 
disability could be appropriate in the relatively few instances in which 
the claimant's vocational profile is extremely adverse, e.g., closely 
approaching retirement age, limited education or less, unskilled or no 
transferable skills, and essentially a lifetime commitment to a field of 
work in which good vision is essential."); SSR 83-15, 1983 WL 31254, at 
*5 ("Where a person has a visual impairment which is not of Listing 
severity but causes the person to be a hazard to self and others -- 
usually a constriction of visual fields rather than a loss of acuity -- 
the 
manifestations of tripping over boxes while walking, inability to detect 
approaching persons or objects, difficulty in walking up and down stairs, 
etc., will indicate to the decisionmaker that the remaining occupational 
base is significantly diminished for light work (and medium work as 
well)."). 
 
                                22 
  
on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the 
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely 
request, to an opportunity to show the contrary." 5 U.S.C. 
S 556(e). 
 
The court in Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983), 
considered whether the use of the grids in that case 
violated the requirements of administrative or official 
notice. The Court rejected the argument, explaining that 
the requirement of official notice serves "to provide a 
procedural safeguard: to ensure the accuracy of the facts of 
which an agency takes notice," and that notice is not 
required for facts established in the grids because"the 
rulemaking proceeding [in which the grids were 
promulgated] itself provides sufficient procedural 
protection." Id. at 470. 
 
In Union Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 890 F.2d 1193, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
interpreted S 556(e) in light of pre-APA decisions involving 
due process challenges to official notice, most notably Ohio 
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 
301 U.S. 292 (1937). In Ohio Bell Telephone, the Ohio 
Public Utilities Commission adjusted the value of the 
utility's property downward, for ratemaking purposes, to 
reflect the Great Depression, which had begun in the 
middle of the ratemaking. As the D.C. Circuit noted, the 
Supreme Court did not object to the commission's notice of 
the Great Depression, but it objected to the commission's 
use of data on general economic decline to adjust rates, 
 
       for the general decline did not show "[h]ow great the 
       decline has been for this industry or that, for one 
       material or another, in this year or the next." Moreover, 
       the Ohio commission manifested a "deeper vice" by 
       never disclosing the particular evidence on which it 
       relied. Thus the party against which the officially 
       noticed facts were used had no opportunity to "see the 
       evidence or hear it and parry its effect." 
 
Union Electric, 890 F.2d at 1202 (quoting Ohio Bell 
Telephone, 301 U.S. at 301-02). The D.C. Circuit thus 
identified two prerequisites to official notice:"First, the 
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information noticed must be appropriate for official notice. 
Second, the agency must follow proper procedures in using 
the information, disclosing it to the parties and affording 
them a suitable opportunity to contradict it or`parry its 
effect.' " Id. (quoting Ohio Bell Telephone, 301 U.S. at 302). 
 
Union Electric itself was a case reviewing a rate approval 
order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
("FERC"). See id. at 1194. The D.C. Circuit had no difficulty 
with FERC's taking notice of a change in the rate on 10- 
year Treasury bonds because "such information is not 
typically subject to dispute." Id. at 1203 (quoting 
Mississippi Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)). The Court disapproved, however, of the 
Commission's procedures in using the Treasury interest 
rates for inferences on the cost of equity, because the 
procedures did "not adequately protect Union's right to 
`parry [their] effect.' " Id. (quoting Ohio Bell Telephone, 301 
U.S. at 302). "[T]he Commission apparently assumed a 
linear relationship between the trend for 10-year Treasury 
bond rates and that for Union's cost of equity capital. 
Union raised substantial objections to the official notice 
and was therefore entitled to an opportunity to dispute the 
Commission's findings." Id. (citing Market St. Ry. Co. v. 
Railroad Comm'n of Calif., 324 U.S. 548, 562 (1945) (a 
hearing on officially noticed evidence must be granted so 
long as the requesting party can make a good showing that 
it can contest the evidence)). 
 
Though we do not decide whether the Commissioner 
could rely on official notice to establish that the lack of 
binocular vision does not significantly diminish the 
occupational base for light work, we do note that, under 
Union Electric, the ALJ would have had to provide Sykes 
with notice of his intent to notice that fact and, if Sykes 
raised a substantial objection, an opportunity to respond 
similar to that required in Union Electric. The ALJ provided 
no such notice. Sykes had no opportunity here to see the 
evidence (if any) on which the ALJ relied to determine that 
the lack of binocular vision does not significantly diminish 
the occupational base for light work and no opportunity to 
challenge that conclusion in the hearing. On remand, if the 
ALJ intends to rely on official notice rather than additional 
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vocational evidence to establish that Sykes's nonexertional 
impairment does not diminish his occupational base for 
light work, the ALJ must provide notice to Sykes that he 
intends to notice that the lack of binocular vision causes no 
diminution in the occupation base and give Sykes an 
opportunity to respond.16 
 
C. Vocational Evidence 
 
We turn now to the question what additional evidence the 
Commissioner must present to meet the burden of 
establishing that there are jobs in the national economy 
that a claimant with exertional and nonexertional 
impairments can perform. As our survey of circuit law in 
footnote 11, supra, demonstrates, the courts of appeals 
differ in what additional evidence they require the 
Commissioner to present to meet this burden. Some 
explicitly require the testimony of a vocational expert, see, 
e.g., Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 
1990) (per curiam); some require a vocational expert or 
similar evidence, see, e.g., Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 
606 (2d Cir. 1986); and some require only that the 
Commissioner independently examine the additional 
consequences resulting from the nonexertional 
impairment(s), see Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 
1155-56 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 
We have never defined what sort of evidence the 
Commissioner must present to meet his burden of proof 
(and provide the requisite notice to the claimant) when the 
claimant has exertional and nonexertional impairments. 
Upon reflection, we cast our lot with those courts of appeals 
that require the testimony of a vocational expert or other 
similar evidence, such as a learned treatise. In the absence 
of evidence in addition to the guidelines (excepting the 
option of administrative notice, see supra section III.B), the 
Commissioner cannot establish that there are jobs in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. As we also have held that the ALJ must reevaluate Sykes's complaint 
of pain, and as the government seems to have conceded that the ALJ 
erred in concluding that Sykes can lift his right arm above his shoulder, 
the ALJ on remand must treat these impairments in a manner 
consistent with this opinion as well. 
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national economy that someone with the claimant's 
combination of impairments can perform. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
The government argues that the rule we adopt today is 
"rigid and burdensome." We emphasize that it need not be. 
The Commissioner frequently relies on vocational expert 
testimony; he appears to have arrangements with many 
such experts. But, as we have held, the Commissioner can 
rely on evidence other than vocational expert testimony to 
establish that a claimant's nonexertional limitation does not 
diminish residual functional capacity. Moreover, we read 
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983), to leave open the 
question whether the Commissioner could formally notice a 
fact such as that the loss of binocular vision does not 
significantly erode the job base for light work, giving the 
claimant the opportunity to respond to the fact to be 
noticed. 
 
The flaw in the government's argument is simple. 
Campbell permits the government to establish through a 
rulemaking rather than an individualized fact-finding the 
fact that there are jobs in the economy for claimants with 
particular types of impairments. See 461 U.S. at 467-68. 
But it does not permit the government to avoid its burden 
to establish this fact. To hold otherwise would be to 
eviscerate the requirement that disability hearings will be 
individualized determinations based on evidence adduced 
at a hearing. See id. at 467 (noting that the Social Security 
Act specifically requires both consideration of each 
individual's condition and that the disability determination 
be based on evidence adduced at a hearing). 
 
IV. 
 
We conclude that the government's interpretation of 20 
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, S 200.00(e)(2) 
(1999) does not comport with the Social Security Act as 
construed by Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983). The 
Commissioner cannot establish that there are jobs in the 
national economy that Sykes can perform by relying on the 
grids alone, even if he uses the grids only as a framework 
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instead of to direct a finding of no disability. 17 The 
judgment will therefore be reversed and the case remanded 
to the District Court with instructions to remand it to the 
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Sykes argues that the Commissioner's position in this case amounts 
to non-acquiescence in our decisions in Burnam v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 
456 (3d Cir. 1982), and Washington v. Heckler , 756 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 
1985), and thus that we should reverse the Commissioner's decision and 
award benefits to Sykes on that basis. We do not believe that the 
Commissioner's position amounts to non-acquiescence."[N]on- 
acquiescence in Circuit law involves a determination by the agency that 
it will refuse to follow judicial decisions it believes are not consistent 
with either the statute or validly adopted agency regulations." Wilkerson 
v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 833-34 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990). The ALJ did not 
appear to be aware of our precedential rulings, and although in his 
submission to the Appeals Council Sykes referred to the lack of a 
vocational counselor, he did not cite either Burnam or Washington. 
Further, the Commissioner has not asserted a right not to follow Burnam 
and Washington, and Washington explicitly leaves open the possibility 
that the Commissioner may use the grids as a framework in meeting the 
step-five burden for a claimant with exertional and nonexertional 
impairments. See 756 F.2d at 967-68. Thus, the Commissioner's 
argument that he followed Burnam and Washington insofar as he only 
relied on the grids as a "framework," although unavailing, does not 
amount to non-acquiescence. That said, however, we note that we find 
utterly no excuse for the Commissioner failing even to mention Burnam 
and Washington in his brief, although Sykes cited and relied upon them 
in his opening brief. 
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